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1  Introduction
Often, the possibility of a multiverse is given as a defeater for the anthropic argument: if there are many,
possibly even an infinite number of worlds1, then the probability of having a life-permitting world is no
longer low.  This article shows that the possibility of a multiverse doesn’t defeat the anthropic argument.
2  The anthropic argument
In 2005, Lydia McGrew tried to show that when evaluating the anthropic argument, the most reasonable
reaction to the multiverse hypothesis was to ignore it.  On the one hand, one could counter it with a God-
created multiverse, and on the other, we have (per hypothesis) no information about or interaction with
any of the other worlds in the multiverse.
Her proposal was apt, but for a different reason: the possible existence of a multiverse doesn’t alter the
probabilities involved in the anthropic argument.
Let N be the proposition that worlds occur by chance,  with random parameters for the fundamental
constants according to some relevant probability distribution that makes life-permitting worlds extremely
unlikely, but not impossible2 – 0<L(N)⋘1 being the probability of a chance-generated world being life-
permitting.  Let G be the proposition that God creates worlds, all of which are life-permitting – i.e. L(G)=1.
Let p(N)>0 resp. p(G)>0 be the prior probability of N resp. G being true.  For the purposes of this article
we can zoom in such that p(N∨G)=1, i.e. only the relative probabilities are relevant.  Also, let #(N) be the
number of life-permitting worlds produced under proposition N, and #(G) the number of (life-permitting)
worlds produced under proposition G.
The  traditional  anthropic  argument  deals  with  the  case  that  #(N)=#(G)=1,  and  states  that  since
p(N)×L(N)⋘p(N)  whereas  p(G)×L(G)=p(G),  for  any  reasonable  choice  of  p(N)  and  p(G),
p(N)×L(N)≪p(G)×L(G) – that is, our world is probably God-created. 
3  The naive counterargument
The naive argument from the multiverse is that if God only created one (or relatively few) worlds, and the
multiverse  is  large,  it  is  possible  that  p(N)×#(N)  ≫ p(G)×#(G)  –  most  possible  worlds  are  chance-
generated.   If  so,  our  world too is  probably chance-generated,  and not God-created.   With the right
numbers, the likelihood of our world being chance-generated might be overwhelming
This argument, reduced to standard probability imagery, consists of two processes N and G adding balls
to an urn: N adds balls that with probability L are red and with probability 1-L are black, whereas G adds
red balls.  All balls bear a letter, N or G, depending on the process that added it.  Now a ball is drawn, and
it is red – what is the probability it bears the letter G?  Obviously, if N adds enough balls compared to G,
the red ball will most probably bear an N.
The error in the argument is that the two processes are seen as active at the same time.  In reality, the
anthropic argument assumes that p(N∧G)=0, so that the urn is filled either with N-balls or with G-balls,
but not with both3.
4  The sophisticated counterargument
The sophisticated argument from the multiverse accepts that p(N∧G)=0, but claims that if N produces
enough worlds, the probability that it produces a life-permitting one approaches 1,  and therefore the
probabilities that our world is chance-generated or God-created are p(N) and p(G), respectively.
1 In this article, the word “world” refers to a universe, not to a planet.
2 The question whether this makes sense at all, whether worlds with other values are really possible and
whether there is a reasonable probability distribution is legitimate, but beyond the scope of this paper.
3 Below we shall see that our main result still goes through if p(N∧G)>0, as long as p(G∧¬N)>0, i.e. as
long as possibly God creates worlds but chance doesn’t.
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Reduced to standard imagery, this argument proposes the following algorithm:
1. Flip a loaded coin, with sides N and G, and associated probabilities p(N) and p(G).
2. Let the process indicated by the coin fill the urn.
• (i.e. if the coin flip yielded N, let process N fill the urn; if G, let process G fill the urn.)
3. Draw a ball until a red ball is drawn.  (In case of a black ball, the ball-drawing failed.)
4. Return the letter on the ball.
Indeed, this procedure will return “N” or “G” with probability p(N) or p(G), respectively, provided process N
produces at least one red ball (otherwise the procedure may diverge).
The error here is that the failure of the experiment is kept local, as if a sentient being could keep choosing
worlds until it found a life-permitting one.  In reality, we get only one chance: if the world is not life-
permitting, we won’t exist.  So the correct algorithm is:
1. Do the following:
1. Flip a loaded coin, with sides N and G, and associated probabilities p(N) and p(G).
2. Let the process indicated by the coin fill the urn.
3. Draw a ball.
until a red ball is drawn.  (In case of a black ball, the whole experiment failed.)
2. Return the letter on the ball.
This procedure corresponds to the actual situation, and if repeated often enough will “N” and “G” in the
ratio of p(N)×L(N) : p(G)×L(G)=p(G).  The number of worlds produced by N and G doesn’t enter into the
result – provided that for either process X, if p(X)>0 then the number of worlds produced is also >0.
In other words: the possibility that either or both processes produce more worlds is irrelevant to the
probabilities.
5  Objections
1. But if God, if He exists, only creates one world, whereas some chance process, if it exists, creates
endless numbers of worlds, including endless numbers of liveable worlds – each of those worlds could
be our world, so in all probability it is not going to be the one created one.
That is a restatement of the naive argument.  Imagine the probability interval divided into two parts:
I(N) for N, and I(G) for G.  All chance-created worlds have intervals that form a disjunct covering of I(N),
so if there are many worlds, each world will have a really small interval.  Likewise for G – all created
worlds together will cover G, so if there is only one created world, its probability interval will be I(G) –
i.e. the probability that the created world is chosen is much greater than the probability than any one
of the chance-generated worlds is chosen.  And most of those chance worlds are black, lifeless4.
2. Our universe is hardly habitable – for all we know only one small planet contains life.  What if chance-
generated  worlds,  if  life-permitting,  accommodate  intelligent  life  on  a  massive  scale,  more  than
enough to offset the low probability of such worlds being life-permitting?
In the case of one world with two planets, one with a large and one with a small population, that would
increase the probability of being on the large planet5, analogous to the naive argument.  In the proper
set-up, where only one world from a multiverse is chosen, it wouldn’t change the result, but only add a
vacuous third stage: first select the process (coin), then the world (ball), then the person in that world.
3. But what if p(N∧G)>0?
Provided p(G∧¬N)>0, we do the Christian thing and charitably yield the disputed area to N, i.e. we
play p(N) against p(G∧¬N)>0.  This will underestimate the probability for G, so if “G” is more probable
than “N” in this modified case, it surely will be in the original case.
4. And what if possibly God also creates non-life-permitting worlds?
We take G to be the proposition that God produces only life-permitting worlds.  If besides G and N
there is a G’ where God makes possibly lifeless worlds, again probability of finding “G” on our red ball
will be higher than indicated by our process (that ignores G’).
5. But if the potential multiverse is huge, with virtual certainty containing at least one life-permitting
world, then with probability p(N) all theists are wrong in claiming God created the world.
No – this objection confounds prior and posterior probabilities.  Given that we are in this life-permitting
world (which is almost certainly God-created), that probability is in the order of to L, i.e. virtually zero.
4 We can imagine each of these world-intervals as being mostly black, with a minute red segment, or –
if the number of worlds is large enough, as most of the intervals being black, and a tiny fraction red.
5 Even though the probabilities don’t all have to be equal.  In fact, if the number of worlds, or of people
in a world, were countably infinite, there would be no uniform probability distribution.
J. A. Durieux 2017-07-16 2/2
